Introduction
Social Security has gained importance in a world of increasingly volatile incomes. Social Security benefits stabilize retirement incomes, especially for people who experience earnings fluctuations and unemployment spells during their careers. Retirement incomes consequently fluctuate less than people's earnings do. The need for such stabilization of retirement incomes has increased as earnings, work schedules, and expenses have become more volatile (Dynan, Elmendorf, & Sichel, 2007; Hardy, 2017; Hardy & Ziliak, 2014; Ziliak, Hardy, & Bollinger, 2011) .
Several factors underlie the increase in income volatility since the mid-1980s. These include more caregiving responsibilities due to aging, more single-headed households (Boushey, 2016; Ellis & Simmons, 2014) , longer unemployment spells, and less labor market mobility, with stagnant wages (Kopczuk, Saez, & Song, 2010) . Moreover, increased labor market uncertainties, such as the ones associated with caregiving responsibilities, potential unemployment spells, and unstable jobs, adversely hamper people's ability to save (Weller, 2015) . This is more pronounced for individuals from marginalized or stigmatized racial, gender, and ethnic groups. Their jobs and earnings are more precarious, and they tend to have more caregiving and financial responsibilities due to extended kin and friend networks of other people also living in poverty (Chiteji and Hamilton, 2002) , thus contributing to the persistent racial wealth gap (Hamilton & Darity, 2009 .
People need stronger Social Security retirement benefits to partially offset the increase of earnings volatility. Workers could enjoy more stable benefits if they earned credits toward benefits when caregiving during periods of unemployment and when pursuing job training programs. People would not lose all of their retirement benefits when they experienced earnings shocks, even if their earnings disappeared.
increasing labor market volatility, such as longer spells of unemployment and less upward earnings mobility.
All three of our proposed changes would affect the way people earn credit toward Social Security benefits. Social Security retirement benefits are ultimately based on people's average earnings for the 35 years in which they had the highest earnings.
1 Most important for our purposes, this means that, if a worker had fewer than 35 years of earnings, the missing years are counted as years with zero earnings when computing Social Security benefits. These zero-earning years then reduce their average lifetime earnings and, consequently, Social Security benefits. People can have zero-earnings years, for instance, if they care for a family member, are unemployed, or take time away from paid work for job training to increase their future earning potential. Their benefits end up being less than if they had continuously worked.
Caregiving Credit
First, we propose allowing workers to earn credits for caring for a family member or friend, starting in 2018. Workers would earn credits toward Social Security benefits for caring for somebody else at least 20 hours per week. This includes children up to the age of 10, as well as ailing family members and friends. Caregivers could receive up to three years' worth of credit. For a married couple, each spouse can qualify for the maximum years of credits, although only one spouse can receive the credit in a given time period. Caregivers would be credited 60% of the average wage index (AWI)-$49,121 for 2016-as long as they earned 60% or less of the AWI. Otherwise, they would receive credit between 60 and 105% of their earnings. Those earning at least the AWI in a given year would be credited 105% of their earnings (Supplementary Table  S1 includes a detailed formula for the calculation of the caregiving credit). Furthermore, credits would be prorated for the actual time of caregiving, from one quarter year up to three years.
Moreover, people who already receive Social Security retirement benefits would also see a benefit from caregiving. The Social Security Administration would recalculate their monthly benefits by replacing past zero-earnings years with earnings equal to 60% of that year's AWI 2 or, if somebody had no zero-earnings years, increase his or her average indexed monthly earnings, which determines the amount of benefits somebody receives, by one-thirtieth, or 3.3%.
3 Either approach would permanently increase retirement benefits in annual steps after caregiving was completed. People could see up to three increases in their retirement benefits if they did not get any caregiving credits prior to retiring but cared for somebody for three years while in retirement.
The caregiving credit faces a unique challenge. There is typically no record for most people who perform unpaid or very low-pay caregiving work for a family member or friend. Receiving a caregiving credit, though, requires that the Social Security Administration receive some certification that people performed caregiving work. For parents caring for a child, it will suffice to document that the child lived with them. Grandparents caring for a child would need to either show that they were legal guardians or present a notarized statement from the parents that the grandparents were responsible for substantial care-at least 20 hours a week-for a grandchild. For other caregiving work, such as elder care or caring for somebody with disabilities, caregivers could similarly collect verifiable documentation. This could include a letter from the person they cared for or his or her guardian, certifying the caregiving services were performed. They would also collect documentation proving that the person needed care. 4 Such documentation could be a Medicaid eligibility determination for long-term and in-home care services; Social Security Disability Insurance benefits; private disability insurance benefits; and a physician's functional assessment of that person, showing that the cared-for person could not live independently without care. Caregivers would collect and retain the required paperwork, similar to the required documentation for business expenses claimed on tax returns. To minimize the burden on caregivers, the tax authorities would include a short new line on tax forms showing that somebody was a caregiver for a specified amount of time during a particular tax year. People would indicate that they were caregivers on their tax returns, and retain the relevant documentations for a reasonable timeframe, typically three years.
Credit While Unemployed
We also propose to grant workers credits toward Social Security benefits while receiving unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Each unemployed worker could receive credit 1 People need to earn a minimum number of credits to become eligible for benefits. In 2016, a worker needed $1,260 of earnings to earn one quarter year of credits. That is, a worker who earned at least $5,040 in 2016 received four quarters (one year) worth of credit for that year. A worker needs 40 quarter-year credits to be eligible for retirement benefits, and must reach age 62 to be eligible for at least early retirement benefits.
2
The Social Security Administration would first replace the year with the highest wage-adjusted substantial earnings, if somebody had more than next highest substantial earnings year credits. We chose one-thirtieth here, even though benefits are calculated on the basis of the highest 35 years. The logic is that those with full career earnings-35 years-should receive a relative increase in their benefit that resembles that of somebody who did not have a full career. toward Social Security benefits equal to 60% of AWI for the length of their UI benefit receipt, up to six months for each eligible unemployment spell. A worker who received UI benefits for three months would then receive the same credit toward Social Security benefits as a worker who earned $7,368-one-fourth of 60% of $49,121-during this three-month period. A worker could receive up to three years' worth of credit toward Social Security benefits while receiving UI benefits. Unemployment insurance agencies would report names and lengths of unemployment to the Social Security Administration.
Credit During Job Training
Third, we propose to give workers who participate in unpaid or low-pay training programs, such as Jobs Corp, credit for their time. The dynamic nature of our economy requires continuous workforce retooling and training. Our proposal is meant to mitigate some of the retirement security-related risk and discouragement from these skill developments. Workers would receive credit equal to substantial earnings-$22,050 in 2016-for the time they spent in training. Accredited job training programs would report those times to the Social Security Administration. Workers would have to be at least 21 years of age to receive such credits, under the assumption that training at earlier ages would likely consist of some college education. Workers could earn up to three years' worth of credits for job training.
Additional Implementation Considerations Related to New Ways to Earn Credits
We briefly discuss a number of details related to the implementation here. First, workers could qualify for only one type of new credit at a time.
Second, we propose that workers could earn a combined maximum of five years' worth of credits for caregiving, unemployment, and job training during their careers. Specifically, they would receive credit for the five years of highest wage-adjusted earnings if they had accumulated more than five years of such credits from the three new forms of earning credits. Credits above the five-year maximum would be recorded as zero or as actual earnings, in the case of people who had some earnings from work in those years. The additional quarters above the five-year maximum would not count as quarters toward benefit eligibility.
Third, our proposed changes would automatically update each year as wages went up. The amount each worker was credited for caregiving during unemployment spells and training periods would be tied to average wages.
Fourth, the credits would start in 2018. Workers would receive credits only for qualifying events-caregiving, unemployment, and job training-in 2018 and in later years. They would not receive credits for qualified events that occurred prior to 2018. This would mean that the full benefits would gradually phase in over time.
Current Policy
Our proposal presents a meaningful improvement over existing policy by explicitly acknowledging the economic insecurities that workers face during their careers. Currently, workers do not receive credits for caregiving, during unemployment, or during job training. Workers can, however, currently receive an implicit benefit for caregiving through the spousal benefit. Spouses, typically women, who take time out from the labor market to care for children, family members, and friends, but also due to unemployment and job training, may end up with relatively low benefits based on their own earnings. They will receive 50% of their husbands' benefits if their own benefits are below that amount.
The current spousal benefit, while important, falls short in a number of ways. It offers no benefit to single women and men, who increasingly take on child care and elder care responsibilities (Weller & Tolson, 2017) . Similarly, it offers no benefits to single women and men during unemployment spells or when they pursue job training. It offers very limited income protections in a labor market where women increasingly have their own earnings records and men struggle with growing job and earnings instability. Our proposal thus offers greater income security to workers who face increasing labor market insecurities.
Context of Similar Past Proposals
Our proposal builds on a number of previous, related proposals (Favreault, 2008; Herd, 2009 ). These previous proposals follow two separate paths. One approach creates a new minimum benefit for those who have relatively low earnings over the course of their careers. The other approach would change the way workers can earn credits toward Social Security benefits. In these proposals, workers could earn additional credits or they could drop low-or zero-earnings years in the benefit calculation. The German equivalent to Social Security, Rentenversicherung, gives workers credits for child care during spells of unemployment and training (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2016) . The German system shortens the minimum years necessary to receive benefits rather than crediting workers with specific amounts. In that sense, the proposal by Representative Patrick Murphy, a Florida Democrat, for child care credits mirrors the German provision (Social Security Expansion Act, 2015) . We see our proposal as a complement to creating a new minimum benefit for low lifetime earners, not as a supplement. Minimum benefits target very low lifetime earners, but they can come with their own administrative challenges (Herd, 2009 ) and they do not increase the income security of workers with modest earnings.
Instead, making it easier for workers to earn Social Security benefits at moderate levels addresses the labor market challenges that a wider range of workers face. The design challenge is to set the amount that is credited to the worker high enough to improve his or her benefits in a meaningful way relative to current policy, but also avoid giving a disproportionate benefit to higher-income earners who may not need the extra assistance. Our proposed credits meet this dual challenge. They are higher than previously-estimated proposals (Favreault, 2008; Favreault, Mermin, & Steuerle, 2006; Government Accountability Office, 2007) and expand the reasons for such credits to include unemployment and caregiving. Our proposal also avoids disproportionately benefiting higher-income earners, as allowing workers to drop low-or zero-earnings years would (Herd, 2006) . Dropping zero earnings years from the benefit calculations increases benefits especially for higher income earners with full time earnings.
Potential Consequences of Our Proposal
We aim to strengthen workers' income security with our proposals. We have especially attempted to make the new benefits progressive, so that the lowest lifetime earners, and those with the greatest earnings volatility, could receive the largest increase in benefits. Caregivers who receive market pay above the threshold-60% of the AWI-would receive a progressively smaller benefit under our proposal, for instance. Similarly, our credit for times of unemployment favors lower-income earners over higher-income ones. We also cap the credit amount, mirroring caps on weekly unemployment insurance benefits. It is, thus, a small and limited offset for the fact that the eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance receipt favors higher-income earners with more stable jobs. Our job training credit would help all workers in job training programs. Most of these programs focus on lower-income earners, as we discuss below, thus adding to the progressiveness of a flat credit amount for job training purposes.
We should note that our proposed credits could interact with other current or proposed features of Social Security benefits. Allowing people to earn additional credits would raise their primary insurance amount alongside their average indexed monthly earnings. The additional credits would boost all types of benefits. This is intentional, as workers need more protections against income fluctuations amid increasingly uncertain labor markets. Our proposal would also lower the number of workers who would have to rely on a proposed minimum benefit, which we consider an important complement to our proposals (see, for instance, Social Security Administration, 2016). Similarly, our proposed credits could make it easier for spouses with limited earnings records to qualify for their own benefits.
Our proposed changes could also have positive social spillover effects. Our caregiving credit would strengthen the economics of caregiving, formalize informal relationships, and provide dignity to this socially necessary work. Our proposed credit would apply to all caregivers, whether paid or unpaid and whether they cared for children, other family members, or friends. Such a caregiving credit would thus address the realities of the increasing need for caregiving in an aging society with a growing share of singleheaded households and adults without children.
Our proposed changes to the way people would earn credits toward Social Security benefits could have unintended consequences; specifically, a reduction in labor supply. People theoretically could choose to wait a little longer to return to paid work. Such a labor supply effect likely would be small, as our proposal provides only additional benefits in the future, not extra pay in the present, with one small caveat. Some workers, in theory, could decide to collect unemployment insurance longer than they otherwise would have to earn extra credits toward Social Security benefits. Any such effects, if they existed, would be limited by the eligibility criteria and time limits of unemployment insurance. And, in the cases of caregiving and job training, where there might be fewer external limits on time, a lower labor supply-more time caring for others and spent on training-might actually be desirable.
In sum, our proposed changes to Social Security benefits would strengthen the overall protections for those workers who need them most.
Target Populations
The possibility of earning declines disproportionately affects women (Fetterolf & Rudman, 2014; Johnson & Lo Sasso, 2006; Maume, 2008) and communities of color (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016a , 2016b Ellis & Simmons, 2014; Fryer, Pager, & Spenkuch, 2011; Garber, 2016; Hamilton, Austin, & Darity, 2011) due to caregiving, unemployment, and limited labor market mobility, all of which follow from occupational segregation by gender and race. Latinos and African Americans, for example, regularly have higher unemployment rates than Whites, and their likelihood of receiving UI is roughly proportional to their share among the unemployed (Michaelides & Mueser, 2012) . All available evidence suggests that many of these factors have increased over time (Michaelides & Mueser, 2012; Weller & Tolson, 2017) , contributing to rising earnings volatility for these populations (Dynan et al., 2007) .
Earning additional credits would increase the benefits in a targeted way for those most affected by potential earnings losses. On average, benefit increases from the additional credits would tend to be small and would be gradually phased in over long periods of time, as one would expect when it becomes easier for people to earn credits during their careers. Table 1 shows the projected change in the poverty rate among people aged 62 and older in the coming decades. The poverty rate is expected to start to decline by 2055, relative to what it would have been without our proposed changes, and the projected overall decrease in the poverty rate is small.
More important is that the simulations show the poverty rate would drop more for our target audiences. Women, communities of color, and those with less education would see their poverty rates drop more than men, Whites, and those with more education (Table 1) . For instance, the projected poverty rate for women is 0.2 percentage points lower in 2065 than it otherwise would be; the poverty rate for African Americans is 0.4 percentage points lower; and the poverty rate for those with less than high school degrees is 0.6 percentage points lower. These projected decreases in poverty compare to 0.1 percentage point declines for men and Whites, and no change for those with college degrees (Table 1) . That is, the benefit increases would particularly serve the intended target audiences.
And the declines in poverty rates, in some instances, are expected to occur earlier for the target audiences than for their counterparts ( Table 1) . The projected poverty rates for African Americans and Hispanics are somewhat lower than they otherwise would be starting in 2025, while the decline for Whites does not show up until 2055 (Table 1) .
The targeted impact of our proposed changes is also noticeable in the absolute and relative benefit changes ( Table 2 ). If our proposed changes were enacted, women, communities of color, those with less than high school degrees, and low-income families would see larger absolute increases in their Social Security benefits than men, Whites, and those with more education. By 2065, benefits for women, for instance, would be $140 (in 2015 dollars) higher than without our proposed changes. The relevant increase for African Americans would be $138; for those without high school degrees, $176; and for the lowest fifth of earners, $208 (Table 2 ). In comparison, by 2065 men would see a benefit increase equal to $108; Whites, $120; those with college degrees, $103; and those in the highest fifth of lifetime earners, $75 ( Table 2) .
The difference in relative changes would be even more pronounced, since the target audiences would have lower benefits than their counterparts to begin with. By 2065, the extra dollars would amount to a permanent benefit increase equal to 0.2% for women, 0.2% for communities of color, 0.5% for those without high school degrees, and 0.9% for those in the lowest fifth of the earnings distribution (Table 2) . In comparison, the extra benefits would amount to an increase of 0.1% for men, Whites, and those with college degrees (Table 2) . They would also constitute no measurable increase, on average, in benefits for people in the top earnings quintile ( Table 2) .
The results so far suggest that our proposed changes would make Social Security more progressive. Breaking down the relative benefit gains by benefit levels shows this point clearly (Table 3) . Our innovations result in the largest benefit gains for women, communities of color, and people with less than high school degrees at the 10th percentile of the benefit distribution. Women at that benefit level would experience a 2% increase, African Americans a 2.3% gain, and those without a high school degree a 3.1% uptick (Table 3) . These increases would be higher than those for men, Whites, and college graduates at this income level. They are also higher than the relative gains expected at other income levels (Table 3) . Our innovations are well targeted and improve Social Security's progressiveness.
Options to Pay for Additional Benefits
Better benefits could also mean potentially rising longterm Social Security deficits. Broadening the tax base to tax capital income, even at a tax rate below the combined The anticipated net changes to income from both benefit and revenue changes once again highlight the progressive nature of our proposal. The net income changes would be positive for lower-income people, but negative for higher-income ones (Table 4) . And the declines for people in the second and third earnings quintiles would be, on average, fairly modest. We should also note, as we discuss below, that our proposal would extend the solvency of the Social Security trust funds for a few years, thus potentially delaying other adverse changes for all beneficiaries. In fact, on average, payable benefits would probably be more than 5% higher over the long-term due to our proposals, based on the numbers in Table 5 . This increase is more than enough to offset the net declines in net incomes, which would approximately amount to a decline of not more than 1.2% of promised benefits (data based on simulations not shown here).
The simulation results further show that the additional revenue would cover the new benefits and contribute to a reduction of Social Security's long-term deficit. The difference between the income receipts by Social Security and its expenditures would be smaller in every year under our proposal than under current law. In 2065, for instance, the gap between receipts and expenditures would be 8.5% of payroll, instead of 11.8% (Table 5) , and Social Security's actuarial deficit over the next 75 years would be 2% of earnings instead of 2.8% of payroll, an improvement of 27% in Social Security's long-term finances. The combination of benefit and revenue changes would extend the life of the Social Security trust funds from 2034 to 2037. Moreover, the share of promised benefits could be paid for with expected payroll tax revenue increases, even after the Social Security trust funds are exhausted. In 2045, for instance, payroll taxes could pay 84.1% of promised benefits with our changes, instead of 79.1% without the changes (Table 5) . By 2065, Social Security could still pay 81.6% of promised benefits rather than 76.8% (Table 5) . Thus, our proposal not only would improve benefits in a targeted manner, but help to stabilize expected benefits for all workers.
Conclusion
Workers have seen substantial increases in the volatility of their earnings due to added caregiving responsibilities, longer unemployment spells, and fewer career opportunities for people with less education. We propose to make it easier for people to earn credits toward Social Security benefits in those situations. The benefit improvements are well targeted, as they would be larger for women than for men, higher for communities of color than for Whites, and greater for people with less education than for those with more education. We further propose to pay for these benefit improvements and for part of Social Security's long-term financial shortfall by imposing a payroll tax on capital income for higherincome earners. The result of these combined changes would be a more progressive-and financially more viable-social insurance system.
We propose to make it easier for people to earn credits toward Social Security benefits in those situations...The result of these combined changes is a more progressive and financially more viable social insurance system.
